Incentivizing prosumer coalitions with energy management using cooperative game theory
The advances in distributed renewable generation technologies in recent years have started to cause load balancing issues in power networks. Distributed energy storage (ES) systems, although seen as a tool to mitigate the stress on local networks, tend to be operated only to minimize the energy cost...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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IEEE
2018
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| _version_ | 1797088044621234176 |
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| author | Han, L Morstyn, T McCulloch, M |
| author_facet | Han, L Morstyn, T McCulloch, M |
| author_sort | Han, L |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The advances in distributed renewable generation technologies in recent years have started to cause load balancing issues in power networks. Distributed energy storage (ES) systems, although seen as a tool to mitigate the stress on local networks, tend to be operated only to minimize the energy cost of their direct owner. In this paper, cooperative game theory is used to construct an energy grand coalition, in which ES system operations are optimized to minimize the coalitional energy cost. Case studies then show that forming energy coalitions is effective in reducing the variability of a local network load profile. The resulting cooperative game is mathematically proven to be balanced, which means the energy cost savings from the cooperative ES operation can be allocated to the players within the energy grand coalition in a manner that disincentivizes them from exiting from the grand coalition to form smaller coalitions. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:44:17Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:ab82e601-835e-487f-92ca-4198d22667c8 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:44:17Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:ab82e601-835e-487f-92ca-4198d22667c82022-03-27T03:22:24ZIncentivizing prosumer coalitions with energy management using cooperative game theoryJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:ab82e601-835e-487f-92ca-4198d22667c8EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordIEEE2018Han, LMorstyn, TMcCulloch, MThe advances in distributed renewable generation technologies in recent years have started to cause load balancing issues in power networks. Distributed energy storage (ES) systems, although seen as a tool to mitigate the stress on local networks, tend to be operated only to minimize the energy cost of their direct owner. In this paper, cooperative game theory is used to construct an energy grand coalition, in which ES system operations are optimized to minimize the coalitional energy cost. Case studies then show that forming energy coalitions is effective in reducing the variability of a local network load profile. The resulting cooperative game is mathematically proven to be balanced, which means the energy cost savings from the cooperative ES operation can be allocated to the players within the energy grand coalition in a manner that disincentivizes them from exiting from the grand coalition to form smaller coalitions. |
| spellingShingle | Han, L Morstyn, T McCulloch, M Incentivizing prosumer coalitions with energy management using cooperative game theory |
| title | Incentivizing prosumer coalitions with energy management using cooperative game theory |
| title_full | Incentivizing prosumer coalitions with energy management using cooperative game theory |
| title_fullStr | Incentivizing prosumer coalitions with energy management using cooperative game theory |
| title_full_unstemmed | Incentivizing prosumer coalitions with energy management using cooperative game theory |
| title_short | Incentivizing prosumer coalitions with energy management using cooperative game theory |
| title_sort | incentivizing prosumer coalitions with energy management using cooperative game theory |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hanl incentivizingprosumercoalitionswithenergymanagementusingcooperativegametheory AT morstynt incentivizingprosumercoalitionswithenergymanagementusingcooperativegametheory AT mccullochm incentivizingprosumercoalitionswithenergymanagementusingcooperativegametheory |