An instrumental legal moralism
Many writers defend or attack the position nowadays known as legal moralism. According to the most common formulation, legal moralists endorse the following thesis: the fact that φing is morally wrong is a reason to criminalize φing. This chapter considers a different kind of legal moralism, here ca...
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| Formato: | Book section |
| Idioma: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2018
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| _version_ | 1826311246014578688 |
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| author | Edwards, J |
| author2 | Gardner, J |
| author_facet | Gardner, J Edwards, J |
| author_sort | Edwards, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Many writers defend or attack the position nowadays known as legal moralism. According to the most common formulation, legal moralists endorse the following thesis: the fact that φing is morally wrong is a reason to criminalize φing. This chapter considers a different kind of legal moralism, here called instrumental legal moralism (ILM). According to ILM: the fact that criminalizing φing will probably prevent moral wrongs is a reason to criminalize φing. Section I draws some relevant distinctions. In doing so, it clarifies the difference between ILM and the act-centred legal moralism (ALM) commonly discussed in the literature. Sections II–IV consider two prominent arguments for ALM: the retributivist argument, offered by Michael Moore, and the answerability argument, offered by Antony Duff. The chapter shows that, contrary to the intentions of these authors, both arguments in fact support ILM. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:05:30Z |
| format | Book section |
| id | oxford-uuid:ab899e47-b68c-45e5-9752-591ed901edd5 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:05:30Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:ab899e47-b68c-45e5-9752-591ed901edd52023-10-30T10:07:25ZAn instrumental legal moralismBook sectionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843uuid:ab899e47-b68c-45e5-9752-591ed901edd5EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2018Edwards, JGardner, JGreen, LLeiter, BMany writers defend or attack the position nowadays known as legal moralism. According to the most common formulation, legal moralists endorse the following thesis: the fact that φing is morally wrong is a reason to criminalize φing. This chapter considers a different kind of legal moralism, here called instrumental legal moralism (ILM). According to ILM: the fact that criminalizing φing will probably prevent moral wrongs is a reason to criminalize φing. Section I draws some relevant distinctions. In doing so, it clarifies the difference between ILM and the act-centred legal moralism (ALM) commonly discussed in the literature. Sections II–IV consider two prominent arguments for ALM: the retributivist argument, offered by Michael Moore, and the answerability argument, offered by Antony Duff. The chapter shows that, contrary to the intentions of these authors, both arguments in fact support ILM. |
| spellingShingle | Edwards, J An instrumental legal moralism |
| title | An instrumental legal moralism |
| title_full | An instrumental legal moralism |
| title_fullStr | An instrumental legal moralism |
| title_full_unstemmed | An instrumental legal moralism |
| title_short | An instrumental legal moralism |
| title_sort | instrumental legal moralism |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT edwardsj aninstrumentallegalmoralism AT edwardsj instrumentallegalmoralism |