Embedding Epistemic Modals

Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin 'If it is raining and it might not be raining,...' sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin 'If it is raining and I don&...

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Main Authors: Dorr, C, Hawthorne, J
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press 2013
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author Dorr, C
Hawthorne, J
author_facet Dorr, C
Hawthorne, J
author_sort Dorr, C
collection OXFORD
description Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin 'If it is raining and it might not be raining,...' sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin 'If it is raining and I don't know it,...'. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals as expressing propositions about the knowledge of some contextually specified individual or group. This paper develops an explanation of the puzzling facts about embedding within an orthodox framework. © 2013 Dorr and Hawthorne.
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spelling oxford-uuid:ab8b1403-4970-457f-8f82-dbb83422e7eb2022-03-27T03:22:36ZEmbedding Epistemic ModalsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:ab8b1403-4970-457f-8f82-dbb83422e7ebEnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2013Dorr, CHawthorne, JSeth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin 'If it is raining and it might not be raining,...' sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin 'If it is raining and I don't know it,...'. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals as expressing propositions about the knowledge of some contextually specified individual or group. This paper develops an explanation of the puzzling facts about embedding within an orthodox framework. © 2013 Dorr and Hawthorne.
spellingShingle Dorr, C
Hawthorne, J
Embedding Epistemic Modals
title Embedding Epistemic Modals
title_full Embedding Epistemic Modals
title_fullStr Embedding Epistemic Modals
title_full_unstemmed Embedding Epistemic Modals
title_short Embedding Epistemic Modals
title_sort embedding epistemic modals
work_keys_str_mv AT dorrc embeddingepistemicmodals
AT hawthornej embeddingepistemicmodals