Assault and battery: evaluating the security of power conversion systems against electromagnetic injection attacks
Many modern devices, including critical infrastructure, depend on the reliable operation of electrical power conversion systems. The small size and versatility of switchedmode power converters has led to their widespread use. While transformer-based systems passively convert voltage, switchedmode po...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Conference item |
| Language: | English |
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IEEE
2024
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| _version_ | 1824458723720953856 |
|---|---|
| author | Szakály, M Kohler, S Strohmeier, M Martinovic, I |
| author_facet | Szakály, M Kohler, S Strohmeier, M Martinovic, I |
| author_sort | Szakály, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Many modern devices, including critical infrastructure, depend on the reliable operation of electrical power
conversion systems. The small size and versatility of switchedmode power converters has led to their widespread use. While
transformer-based systems passively convert voltage, switchedmode power converters have an actively controlled feedback
loop that relies on accurate sensor measurements. Previous
academic work has shown that many types of sensors are
vulnerable to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI)
attacks, and it has been speculated that power converters are
also susceptible.
In this paper, we present the first detailed and practical
evaluation of IEMI attacks against switched-mode power converters as a whole by manipulating the voltage and current
sensors in their feedback loops. We develop a novel multifrequency IEMI attack technique to effectively target devices
with multiple sensors. We experimentally validate our theoretical predictions by analyzing multiple AC-DC and DCDC converters, automotive-grade current sensors, dedicated
battery chargers, and a real-world electric vehicle charger. Our
attack is reliably effective at overcharging and permanently
damaging Li-ion cells, and causing the EV charger to output
50 V more than it reports. |
| first_indexed | 2025-02-19T04:30:26Z |
| format | Conference item |
| id | oxford-uuid:acb6ee7c-b457-402c-b6f6-b751259580fb |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-02-19T04:30:26Z |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:acb6ee7c-b457-402c-b6f6-b751259580fb2024-12-20T15:36:11ZAssault and battery: evaluating the security of power conversion systems against electromagnetic injection attacksConference itemhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794uuid:acb6ee7c-b457-402c-b6f6-b751259580fbEnglishSymplectic ElementsIEEE2024Szakály, MKohler, SStrohmeier, MMartinovic, IMany modern devices, including critical infrastructure, depend on the reliable operation of electrical power conversion systems. The small size and versatility of switchedmode power converters has led to their widespread use. While transformer-based systems passively convert voltage, switchedmode power converters have an actively controlled feedback loop that relies on accurate sensor measurements. Previous academic work has shown that many types of sensors are vulnerable to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) attacks, and it has been speculated that power converters are also susceptible. In this paper, we present the first detailed and practical evaluation of IEMI attacks against switched-mode power converters as a whole by manipulating the voltage and current sensors in their feedback loops. We develop a novel multifrequency IEMI attack technique to effectively target devices with multiple sensors. We experimentally validate our theoretical predictions by analyzing multiple AC-DC and DCDC converters, automotive-grade current sensors, dedicated battery chargers, and a real-world electric vehicle charger. Our attack is reliably effective at overcharging and permanently damaging Li-ion cells, and causing the EV charger to output 50 V more than it reports. |
| spellingShingle | Szakály, M Kohler, S Strohmeier, M Martinovic, I Assault and battery: evaluating the security of power conversion systems against electromagnetic injection attacks |
| title | Assault and battery: evaluating the security of power conversion systems against electromagnetic injection attacks |
| title_full | Assault and battery: evaluating the security of power conversion systems against electromagnetic injection attacks |
| title_fullStr | Assault and battery: evaluating the security of power conversion systems against electromagnetic injection attacks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Assault and battery: evaluating the security of power conversion systems against electromagnetic injection attacks |
| title_short | Assault and battery: evaluating the security of power conversion systems against electromagnetic injection attacks |
| title_sort | assault and battery evaluating the security of power conversion systems against electromagnetic injection attacks |
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