Reducing compositional to disquotational truth
Disquotational theories of truth, that is, theories of truth based on the T-sentences or similar equivalences as axioms are often thought to be deductively weak. This view is correct if the truth predicate is allowed to apply only to sentences not containing the truth predicate. By taking a slightly...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2009
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| _version_ | 1797088625449500672 |
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| author | Halbach, V |
| author2 | Association for Symbolic Logic |
| author_facet | Association for Symbolic Logic Halbach, V |
| author_sort | Halbach, V |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Disquotational theories of truth, that is, theories of truth based on the T-sentences or similar equivalences as axioms are often thought to be deductively weak. This view is correct if the truth predicate is allowed to apply only to sentences not containing the truth predicate. By taking a slightly more liberal approach toward the paradoxes, I obtain a disquotational theory of truth that is proof theoretically as strong as compositional theories such as the Kripke-Feferman theory, although it doesn't probe the compositional axioms. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:52:47Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:ae411462-c3ed-472e-bded-6fee4f65456c |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:52:47Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:ae411462-c3ed-472e-bded-6fee4f65456c2022-03-27T03:41:19ZReducing compositional to disquotational truthJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:ae411462-c3ed-472e-bded-6fee4f65456cPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetCambridge University Press2009Halbach, VAssociation for Symbolic LogicDisquotational theories of truth, that is, theories of truth based on the T-sentences or similar equivalences as axioms are often thought to be deductively weak. This view is correct if the truth predicate is allowed to apply only to sentences not containing the truth predicate. By taking a slightly more liberal approach toward the paradoxes, I obtain a disquotational theory of truth that is proof theoretically as strong as compositional theories such as the Kripke-Feferman theory, although it doesn't probe the compositional axioms. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Halbach, V Reducing compositional to disquotational truth |
| title | Reducing compositional to disquotational truth |
| title_full | Reducing compositional to disquotational truth |
| title_fullStr | Reducing compositional to disquotational truth |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reducing compositional to disquotational truth |
| title_short | Reducing compositional to disquotational truth |
| title_sort | reducing compositional to disquotational truth |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT halbachv reducingcompositionaltodisquotationaltruth |