Persuasion for the long run
We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of short-run receivers, who observe some record of feedback about past accuracy. When all feedback is public (as is standard...
| Những tác giả chính: | , |
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| Định dạng: | Journal article |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
University of Chicago Press
2024
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| Tóm tắt: | We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of short-run receivers, who observe some record of feedback about past accuracy. When all feedback is public (as is standard in repeated games), persuasion frequently requires inefficient on-path punishment—even if accuracy is monitored perfectly. If instead the record publishes coarse summary statistics (as is common online), any communication equilibrium the sender prefers to one-shot cheap talk—including Bayesian persuasion—can be supported without cost. |
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