Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?
We investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms' ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game. We show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect: the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as these firms can no longer pr...
Main Authors: | Nocke, V, White, L |
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格式: | Journal article |
語言: | English |
出版: |
American Economic Association
2007
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