Regularity and Stability in Monotone Bayesian Games

This paper denes regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with with one-dimensional actions and types. It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium. It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic stabilit...

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Detaylı Bibliyografya
Yazar: Beggs, A
Materyal Türü: Working paper
Dil:English
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: Department of Economics (University of Oxford) 2011
Diğer Bilgiler
Özet:This paper denes regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with with one-dimensional actions and types. It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium. It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic stability.