Regularity and Stability in Monotone Bayesian Games
This paper denes regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with with one-dimensional actions and types. It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium. It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic stabilit...
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| Формат: | Working paper |
| Язык: | English |
| Опубликовано: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2011
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| Итог: | This paper denes regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with with one-dimensional actions and types. It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium. It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic stability. |
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