Agenda-manipulation in ranking
We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation of the order in which pairs of alternatives are voted on—agenda-manipulation. We exhibit an agenda strategy called insert...
Päätekijät: | Curello, G, Sinander, L |
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Aineistotyyppi: | Journal article |
Kieli: | English |
Julkaistu: |
Oxford University Press
2022
|
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