| Summary: | <p>This thesis develops a novel framework for normative reflection about corporate insolvency law in terms of distributive justice. It begins by demonstrating that the dominant theoretical approach in this area—known as proceduralism—is incomplete and, in some ways, incoherent, and seeks to build on these failures in arguing for a new approach. It is argued that corporate insolvency law must address at least two connected sets of questions. The first concerns distribution and the second concerns debtor fidelity. The former questions are questions of distributive justice. While no fully specified theory of distributive justice is defended or developed, it is argued that in a society in which distributive shares are mediated by legal rights, individuals must have the capacity to hold and deal with such legal rights on equal terms. Some dealings with such rights will engage the principle of personal responsibility, such that apparent disadvantages for which individuals are responsible need not be condemned by distributive justice. The statutory order of insolvency distribution, as well as its mandatory character, is considered in the light of these arguments. As individuals make use of the capacity to create or deal with legal rights and obligations, they are bound by ordinary moral principles in so doing. The discussion of debtor fidelity, then, considers a range of such principles and pursues their implications for a range of corporate insolvency law doctrines. Debtor fidelity does not, however, offer a justification for the centerpiece transaction avoidance rules prohibiting mere undervalue transactions and mere preferences. These rules, however, may be justified in terms of distributive justice. A normative critique of a range of fraudulent trading and transaction avoidance doctrines is advanced in terms of such principles.</p>
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