Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula
The paper criticizes the truthmaker principle that every truth is made true by something. If we interpret 'something' as quantifying into sentence position, we can interpret the principle as a harmless logical truth, but that is not what advocates of the principle intend. They interpret &#...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley-Blackwell
1999
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| _version_ | 1797090177392312320 |
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| author | Williamson, T |
| author2 | European Society for Analytic Philosophy |
| author_facet | European Society for Analytic Philosophy Williamson, T |
| author_sort | Williamson, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The paper criticizes the truthmaker principle that every truth is made true by something. If we interpret 'something' as quantifying into sentence position, we can interpret the principle as a harmless logical truth, but that is not what advocates of the principle intend. They interpret 'somthing' as quantifying into name position, and the principle as requiring the existence of truthmaking individuals. The paper argues that we have no reason to believe the principle on this interpretation. Moreover, the converse Barcan formula is inconsistent with the existence of truthmaking individuals for contingent truths. Considerations about our ability to count possible truthmaking individuals are used to argue that we should prefer the converse Barcan formula. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:14:44Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:b568d415-5bc3-467c-8c8e-b9da67a1af10 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:14:44Z |
| publishDate | 1999 |
| publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:b568d415-5bc3-467c-8c8e-b9da67a1af102022-03-27T04:33:18ZTruthmakers and the converse Barcan formulaJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:b568d415-5bc3-467c-8c8e-b9da67a1af10PhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetWiley-Blackwell1999Williamson, TEuropean Society for Analytic PhilosophyThe paper criticizes the truthmaker principle that every truth is made true by something. If we interpret 'something' as quantifying into sentence position, we can interpret the principle as a harmless logical truth, but that is not what advocates of the principle intend. They interpret 'somthing' as quantifying into name position, and the principle as requiring the existence of truthmaking individuals. The paper argues that we have no reason to believe the principle on this interpretation. Moreover, the converse Barcan formula is inconsistent with the existence of truthmaking individuals for contingent truths. Considerations about our ability to count possible truthmaking individuals are used to argue that we should prefer the converse Barcan formula. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Williamson, T Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula |
| title | Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula |
| title_full | Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula |
| title_fullStr | Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula |
| title_full_unstemmed | Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula |
| title_short | Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula |
| title_sort | truthmakers and the converse barcan formula |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT williamsont truthmakersandtheconversebarcanformula |