Unions and equity

Trade unions have been successful in compressing the wage distribution but not in influencing the share of national income going to labour. This paper claims that a compressed wage distribution provides insurance in the same way that the tax and benefit system does and thus may be welfare-improving....

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: O'Shaughnessy, T
Format: Working paper
Published: University of Oxford 2000
_version_ 1826292786927763456
author O'Shaughnessy, T
author_facet O'Shaughnessy, T
author_sort O'Shaughnessy, T
collection OXFORD
description Trade unions have been successful in compressing the wage distribution but not in influencing the share of national income going to labour. This paper claims that a compressed wage distribution provides insurance in the same way that the tax and benefit system does and thus may be welfare-improving. Moreover, a union-based wage compression system may be better than a conventional tax-benefit system in providing such insurance and may well complement the operation of the latter. Models of wage compression and of taxes and benefits are evaluated and then combined in a single model. The wage compression system works well for the least skilled but the tax-benefit approach is better if average utility is being maximized. In the combined model the two mechanisms complement one another. Equity-efficiency trade-offs in the combined system mostly dominate those obtained from each mechanism acting on its own. A key factor is the willingness of skilled workers to defect from a wage compression agreement. Encouraging defection may appeal to policy-makers (labour markets are more flexible) but the benefits of a compressed wage distribution may be lost, placing stress on welfare state institutions and undermining the insurance function that the combined wage-compression/tax-benefit system delivers relatively efficiently.
first_indexed 2024-03-07T03:20:04Z
format Working paper
id oxford-uuid:b7228402-ed75-4504-b42b-c90e4d6ca3da
institution University of Oxford
last_indexed 2024-03-07T03:20:04Z
publishDate 2000
publisher University of Oxford
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:b7228402-ed75-4504-b42b-c90e4d6ca3da2022-03-27T04:46:15ZUnions and equityWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:b7228402-ed75-4504-b42b-c90e4d6ca3daBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2000O'Shaughnessy, TTrade unions have been successful in compressing the wage distribution but not in influencing the share of national income going to labour. This paper claims that a compressed wage distribution provides insurance in the same way that the tax and benefit system does and thus may be welfare-improving. Moreover, a union-based wage compression system may be better than a conventional tax-benefit system in providing such insurance and may well complement the operation of the latter. Models of wage compression and of taxes and benefits are evaluated and then combined in a single model. The wage compression system works well for the least skilled but the tax-benefit approach is better if average utility is being maximized. In the combined model the two mechanisms complement one another. Equity-efficiency trade-offs in the combined system mostly dominate those obtained from each mechanism acting on its own. A key factor is the willingness of skilled workers to defect from a wage compression agreement. Encouraging defection may appeal to policy-makers (labour markets are more flexible) but the benefits of a compressed wage distribution may be lost, placing stress on welfare state institutions and undermining the insurance function that the combined wage-compression/tax-benefit system delivers relatively efficiently.
spellingShingle O'Shaughnessy, T
Unions and equity
title Unions and equity
title_full Unions and equity
title_fullStr Unions and equity
title_full_unstemmed Unions and equity
title_short Unions and equity
title_sort unions and equity
work_keys_str_mv AT oshaughnessyt unionsandequity