| Resumo: | <p>This thesis examines French policy towards the European Defence Community from 1950-1954. In October 1950 the French government proposed the creation of a European defence community (EDC), modelled on the European Coal and Steel Community plan, in reponse to US pressure for West German rearmament. After two years of negotiation a treaty establishing this force was signed between France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux on 27 May 1952. It took a further two years before the project collapsed, the result of the French National Assembly’s failure to ratify the treaty in August 1954. The thesis traces this tortuous path and argues that, despite the apparent inconsistency, the preoccupation which prompted France to introduce the EDC proposal was the same one that led to the rejection of the project four years later. The concern throughout was with securing a position of leadership in the Western Alliance.</p>
<p>The principal factor facilitating French EDC policy continuity, this study contends, was the small circle of individuals that dominated French EDC policymaking. The thesis identifies two principal groups involved in the formulation and management of French EDC policy throughout the four year project: senior administrative officials in the Foreign Ministry and the small transatlantic network of Jean Monnet, the original framer of the EDC proposal. Their perceptions, preoccupations and activities are the key to explaining the paradox of continuity in French EDC policy.</p>
<p>Primary sources form the basis of this study: French, US and British government papers and private papers are used extensively to draw together the complex story of this important episode in the construction of the Western Alliance framework.</p>
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