Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia.

This article provides evidence from one of the poorest countries in the world that the institutions of property rights matter for efficiency, investment, and growth. With all land state-owned, the threat of land redistribution never appears far off the agenda. Land rental and leasing have been made...

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Main Authors: Ali, D, Dercon, S, Gautam, M
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Blackwell Publishing Inc. 2011
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author Ali, D
Dercon, S
Gautam, M
author_facet Ali, D
Dercon, S
Gautam, M
author_sort Ali, D
collection OXFORD
description This article provides evidence from one of the poorest countries in the world that the institutions of property rights matter for efficiency, investment, and growth. With all land state-owned, the threat of land redistribution never appears far off the agenda. Land rental and leasing have been made legal, but transfer rights remain restricted and the perception of continuing tenure insecurity remains quite strong. Using a unique panel data set, this study investigates whether transfer rights and implied tenure insecurity affect household investment decisions, focusing on trees and shrubs. The panel data estimates suggest that limited perceived transfer rights negatively affects the long-term investment in Ethiopian agriculture, contributing to the low returns from land and perpetuating low growth and poverty.
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spelling oxford-uuid:b83c3630-d34d-4d2e-8693-7c23e776543f2022-03-27T04:54:30ZProperty rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:b83c3630-d34d-4d2e-8693-7c23e776543fEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsBlackwell Publishing Inc.2011Ali, DDercon, SGautam, MThis article provides evidence from one of the poorest countries in the world that the institutions of property rights matter for efficiency, investment, and growth. With all land state-owned, the threat of land redistribution never appears far off the agenda. Land rental and leasing have been made legal, but transfer rights remain restricted and the perception of continuing tenure insecurity remains quite strong. Using a unique panel data set, this study investigates whether transfer rights and implied tenure insecurity affect household investment decisions, focusing on trees and shrubs. The panel data estimates suggest that limited perceived transfer rights negatively affects the long-term investment in Ethiopian agriculture, contributing to the low returns from land and perpetuating low growth and poverty.
spellingShingle Ali, D
Dercon, S
Gautam, M
Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia.
title Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia.
title_full Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia.
title_fullStr Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia.
title_full_unstemmed Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia.
title_short Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia.
title_sort property rights in a very poor country tenure insecurity and investment in ethiopia
work_keys_str_mv AT alid propertyrightsinaverypoorcountrytenureinsecurityandinvestmentinethiopia
AT dercons propertyrightsinaverypoorcountrytenureinsecurityandinvestmentinethiopia
AT gautamm propertyrightsinaverypoorcountrytenureinsecurityandinvestmentinethiopia