A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions.
We propose a new, easy-to-implement class of payment rules, “Reference Rules” to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost-riskless, profitable deviations from “truthful bidding” are often easy for bidders to find under currently used payment rules. Reference Rules perform bett...
Main Authors: | Erdil, A, Klemperer, P |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MIT Press
2010
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