Emotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of F.H.Bradley
The philosophers of the self-styled ‘revolution in philosophy’ that went on to become the contemporary analytic tradition started a rumour about the British Idealists that has persisted to this day. Finding neither the substance of the idealist case, nor the style of idealistic writing, congenial to...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Routledge
2017
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| _version_ | 1797091315519848448 |
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| author | Mander, W |
| author_facet | Mander, W |
| author_sort | Mander, W |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The philosophers of the self-styled ‘revolution in philosophy’ that went on to become the contemporary analytic tradition started a rumour about the British Idealists that has persisted to this day. Finding neither the substance of the idealist case, nor the style of idealistic writing, congenial to their modern taste, these Edwardians hinted that their Victorian forbears had argued from emotion rather than reason. No single paper could address this accusation across the board, for the movement in its entirety, and so in this essay I focus on just one case, that of F. H. Bradley. Specifically, I identify the role he allows to feeling, emotion and what he terms ‘satisfaction’ in the determination of metaphysical and moral principles, and further ask whether the critics of idealism were right that there was something untoward in his approach. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:31:13Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:bac7768b-e02f-4eaf-ae28-784323518397 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:31:13Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Routledge |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:bac7768b-e02f-4eaf-ae28-7843235183972022-03-27T05:12:14ZEmotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of F.H.BradleyJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:bac7768b-e02f-4eaf-ae28-784323518397Symplectic Elements at OxfordRoutledge2017Mander, WThe philosophers of the self-styled ‘revolution in philosophy’ that went on to become the contemporary analytic tradition started a rumour about the British Idealists that has persisted to this day. Finding neither the substance of the idealist case, nor the style of idealistic writing, congenial to their modern taste, these Edwardians hinted that their Victorian forbears had argued from emotion rather than reason. No single paper could address this accusation across the board, for the movement in its entirety, and so in this essay I focus on just one case, that of F. H. Bradley. Specifically, I identify the role he allows to feeling, emotion and what he terms ‘satisfaction’ in the determination of metaphysical and moral principles, and further ask whether the critics of idealism were right that there was something untoward in his approach. |
| spellingShingle | Mander, W Emotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of F.H.Bradley |
| title | Emotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of F.H.Bradley |
| title_full | Emotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of F.H.Bradley |
| title_fullStr | Emotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of F.H.Bradley |
| title_full_unstemmed | Emotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of F.H.Bradley |
| title_short | Emotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of F.H.Bradley |
| title_sort | emotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of f h bradley |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT manderw emotionandsatisfactioninthephilosophyoffhbradley |