The fundamental attribution error and Harman's case against character traits

Gilbert Harman argues that the warrant for the lay attribution of character traits is completely undermined by the "fundamental attribution error" (FAE). He takes it to have been established by social psychologists, that the FAE pervades ordinary instances of lay person perception. However...

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Main Author: Clarke, S
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: 2006
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author Clarke, S
author_facet Clarke, S
author_sort Clarke, S
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description Gilbert Harman argues that the warrant for the lay attribution of character traits is completely undermined by the "fundamental attribution error" (FAE). He takes it to have been established by social psychologists, that the FAE pervades ordinary instances of lay person perception. However, examination of recent work in psychology reveals that there are good reasons to doubt that the effects observed in experimental settings, which ground the case for the FAE, pervade ordinary instances of person perception. Furthermore, it is possible to make sense of these experimental results without invoking the FAE. Harman's argument against lay character trait attribution is unsubstantiated.
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spelling oxford-uuid:bb258eeb-8447-469a-a441-d7b01ae2be282022-03-27T05:14:58ZThe fundamental attribution error and Harman's case against character traitsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:bb258eeb-8447-469a-a441-d7b01ae2be28EnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2006Clarke, SGilbert Harman argues that the warrant for the lay attribution of character traits is completely undermined by the "fundamental attribution error" (FAE). He takes it to have been established by social psychologists, that the FAE pervades ordinary instances of lay person perception. However, examination of recent work in psychology reveals that there are good reasons to doubt that the effects observed in experimental settings, which ground the case for the FAE, pervade ordinary instances of person perception. Furthermore, it is possible to make sense of these experimental results without invoking the FAE. Harman's argument against lay character trait attribution is unsubstantiated.
spellingShingle Clarke, S
The fundamental attribution error and Harman's case against character traits
title The fundamental attribution error and Harman's case against character traits
title_full The fundamental attribution error and Harman's case against character traits
title_fullStr The fundamental attribution error and Harman's case against character traits
title_full_unstemmed The fundamental attribution error and Harman's case against character traits
title_short The fundamental attribution error and Harman's case against character traits
title_sort fundamental attribution error and harman s case against character traits
work_keys_str_mv AT clarkes thefundamentalattributionerrorandharmanscaseagainstcharactertraits
AT clarkes fundamentalattributionerrorandharmanscaseagainstcharactertraits