ES risks and shareholder voice
We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face....
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2023
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| _version_ | 1826312068793368576 |
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| author | He, YE Kahraman, B Lowry, M |
| author_facet | He, YE Kahraman, B Lowry, M |
| author_sort | He, YE |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure.
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| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:22:05Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:bb920f6e-213a-4eef-9413-1033aaec0fae |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:22:05Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:bb920f6e-213a-4eef-9413-1033aaec0fae2024-02-02T13:33:24ZES risks and shareholder voiceJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:bb920f6e-213a-4eef-9413-1033aaec0faeEnglishSymplectic ElementsOxford University Press2023He, YEKahraman, BLowry, MWe examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure. |
| spellingShingle | He, YE Kahraman, B Lowry, M ES risks and shareholder voice |
| title | ES risks and shareholder voice |
| title_full | ES risks and shareholder voice |
| title_fullStr | ES risks and shareholder voice |
| title_full_unstemmed | ES risks and shareholder voice |
| title_short | ES risks and shareholder voice |
| title_sort | es risks and shareholder voice |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT heye esrisksandshareholdervoice AT kahramanb esrisksandshareholdervoice AT lowrym esrisksandshareholdervoice |