| Summary: | In this article I propose a new way of making rational sense of our seemingly divergent intuitions across cases. The key is the idea, briefly suggested by Robert Nozick,4 that there is an important sense of ‘ought’ (though not the only sense of ‘ought’) according which a decision-maker ought to take their decision-theoretic uncertainty into account when making decisions. I call the general idea that there are norms that take into account normative uncertainty metanormativism, and any decisiontheory that takes decision-theoretic uncertainty into account a meta decision theory.<p>Meta decision theory has two important implications. First, it can explain the apparent divergence in our intuitions between the Standard Predictor, The Smoking Lesion, and The Psychopath Button. Second, it undermines both the intuitive argument in favour of EDT, and, to some extent, the “Why Ain’cha Rich?” 36 argument as well. Considerations of decision-theoretic uncertainty are therefore a powerful tool for use in debates between causal and evidential decision theory — a tool that gives the causal approach a significant new advantage.</p>
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