The value of a coordination game
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2021
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| _version_ | 1826293864502132736 |
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| author | Kets, W Kager, W Sandroni, A |
| author_facet | Kets, W Kager, W Sandroni, A |
| author_sort | Kets, W |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone’s payoffs can reduce welfare. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:36:44Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:bc8bde63-11ee-46a4-a9f7-337c79c17a3e |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:36:44Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:bc8bde63-11ee-46a4-a9f7-337c79c17a3e2022-03-27T05:25:12ZThe value of a coordination gameWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:bc8bde63-11ee-46a4-a9f7-337c79c17a3eSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2021Kets, WKager, WSandroni, AThe value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone’s payoffs can reduce welfare. |
| spellingShingle | Kets, W Kager, W Sandroni, A The value of a coordination game |
| title | The value of a coordination game |
| title_full | The value of a coordination game |
| title_fullStr | The value of a coordination game |
| title_full_unstemmed | The value of a coordination game |
| title_short | The value of a coordination game |
| title_sort | value of a coordination game |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ketsw thevalueofacoordinationgame AT kagerw thevalueofacoordinationgame AT sandronia thevalueofacoordinationgame AT ketsw valueofacoordinationgame AT kagerw valueofacoordinationgame AT sandronia valueofacoordinationgame |