The value of a coordination game
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new...
Päätekijät: | Kets, W, Kager, W, Sandroni, A |
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Aineistotyyppi: | Working paper |
Julkaistu: |
University of Oxford
2021
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