The value of a coordination game
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new...
Auteurs principaux: | Kets, W, Kager, W, Sandroni, A |
---|---|
Format: | Working paper |
Publié: |
University of Oxford
2021
|
Documents similaires
-
The value of a coordination game
par: Kets, W, et autres
Publié: (2022) -
A belief-based theory of homophily
par: Kets, W, et autres
Publié: (2019) -
A theory of strategic uncertainty and cultural diversity
par: Kets, W, et autres
Publié: (2020) -
A theory of strategic uncertainty and cultural diversity
par: Kets, W, et autres
Publié: (2020) -
Learning with fixed rules: the minority game
par: Kets, W
Publié: (2011)