Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias
Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hyp...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2022
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| _version_ | 1797108577593196544 |
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| author | Latham, A Miller, K Tarsney, C Tierney, H |
| author_facet | Latham, A Miller, K Tarsney, C Tierney, H |
| author_sort | Latham, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our (tacit) beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the temporal belief hypothesis according to which future-bias is explained by the belief that time robustly passes. Our results do not match the apparent predictions of this hypothesis, and so provide evidence against it. But we also find that people give more future-biased responses when asked to simulate a belief in robust passage. We take this to suggest that the phenomenology that attends simulation of that belief may be partially responsible for future-bias, and we examine the implications of these results for debates about the rationality of future-bias.
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| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:30:53Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:bd69bfa5-89c4-431d-a83c-bf538353b865 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:30:53Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:bd69bfa5-89c4-431d-a83c-bf538353b8652023-01-11T07:51:47ZBelief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-biasJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:bd69bfa5-89c4-431d-a83c-bf538353b865EnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2022Latham, AMiller, KTarsney, CTierney, HEmpirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our (tacit) beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the temporal belief hypothesis according to which future-bias is explained by the belief that time robustly passes. Our results do not match the apparent predictions of this hypothesis, and so provide evidence against it. But we also find that people give more future-biased responses when asked to simulate a belief in robust passage. We take this to suggest that the phenomenology that attends simulation of that belief may be partially responsible for future-bias, and we examine the implications of these results for debates about the rationality of future-bias. |
| spellingShingle | Latham, A Miller, K Tarsney, C Tierney, H Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias |
| title | Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias |
| title_full | Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias |
| title_fullStr | Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias |
| title_full_unstemmed | Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias |
| title_short | Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias |
| title_sort | belief in robust temporal passage probably does not explain future bias |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lathama beliefinrobusttemporalpassageprobablydoesnotexplainfuturebias AT millerk beliefinrobusttemporalpassageprobablydoesnotexplainfuturebias AT tarsneyc beliefinrobusttemporalpassageprobablydoesnotexplainfuturebias AT tierneyh beliefinrobusttemporalpassageprobablydoesnotexplainfuturebias |