Learning Dynamics, Lock-in, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games.
This paper compares the leading theoretical approaches to equilibrium selection, both traditional and adaptive, in the light of recent experiments by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (henceforth "VHBB") in which subjects repeatedly played coordination games, uncertain only about each other...
Main Author: | Crawford, V |
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Other Authors: | Pagano, U |
Format: | Book section |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Routledge
2001
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