Learning Dynamics, Lock-in, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games.
This paper compares the leading theoretical approaches to equilibrium selection, both traditional and adaptive, in the light of recent experiments by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (henceforth "VHBB") in which subjects repeatedly played coordination games, uncertain only about each other...
Autor principal: | Crawford, V |
---|---|
Otros Autores: | Pagano, U |
Formato: | Book section |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Routledge
2001
|
Ejemplares similares
-
Dynamic analysis of equilibrium selection in games
por: Amaya, Kenichi, 1973-
Publicado: (2005) -
Defense coordination in security games: equilibrium analysis and mechanism design
por: Gan, J, et al.
Publicado: (2022) -
Introduction to Experimental Game Theory.
por: Crawford, V
Publicado: (2002) -
Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games
por: Acemoglu, Daron, et al.
Publicado: (2011) -
Dynamic global game coordination risks
por: Vieira, Thiago Andrew
Publicado: (2018)