Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge.
Fitch's argument purports to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. The argument exploits the fact that the knowledge predicate or operator is untyped and may thus apply to sentences containing itself. This article outlines a response to Fitch's argument based on t...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Published: |
2008
|
| _version_ | 1826294110515888128 |
|---|---|
| author | Paseau, A |
| author_facet | Paseau, A |
| author_sort | Paseau, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Fitch's argument purports to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. The argument exploits the fact that the knowledge predicate or operator is untyped and may thus apply to sentences containing itself. This article outlines a response to Fitch's argument based on the idea that knowledge is typed. The first part of the article outlines the philosophical motivation for the view, comparing it to the motivation behind typing truth. The second, formal part presents a logic in which knowledge is typed and demonstrates that it allows nonlogical truths to be knowable yet unknown. © 2008 by University of Notre Dame. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:40:34Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:bdc07197-2f0f-4341-8bd9-b28107fd3c0b |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:40:34Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:bdc07197-2f0f-4341-8bd9-b28107fd3c0b2022-03-27T05:34:07ZFitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:bdc07197-2f0f-4341-8bd9-b28107fd3c0bSymplectic Elements at Oxford2008Paseau, AFitch's argument purports to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. The argument exploits the fact that the knowledge predicate or operator is untyped and may thus apply to sentences containing itself. This article outlines a response to Fitch's argument based on the idea that knowledge is typed. The first part of the article outlines the philosophical motivation for the view, comparing it to the motivation behind typing truth. The second, formal part presents a logic in which knowledge is typed and demonstrates that it allows nonlogical truths to be knowable yet unknown. © 2008 by University of Notre Dame. |
| spellingShingle | Paseau, A Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge. |
| title | Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge. |
| title_full | Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge. |
| title_fullStr | Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge. |
| title_short | Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge. |
| title_sort | fitch s argument and typing knowledge |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT paseaua fitchsargumentandtypingknowledge |