Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
We prove a natural comparative static for many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ choice functions exhibit size-dependent discounts: reducing the extent to which some agent discounts additional partners leads to improved outcomes for the agents on the other side of the market, and worsened ou...
Autors principals: | Delacretaz, D, Kominers, SD, Nichifor, A |
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Format: | Journal article |
Idioma: | English |
Publicat: |
Elsevier
2020
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