A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy.
We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. A project's characteristics are verifiable once presented to the principal, but the principal does not know how many projects are available to the agent. The principal chooses the set...
| Hoofdauteurs: | , |
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| Formaat: | Journal article |
| Taal: | English |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Blackwell Publishing
2010
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| _version_ | 1826294261546483712 |
|---|---|
| author | Armstrong, M Vickers, J |
| author_facet | Armstrong, M Vickers, J |
| author_sort | Armstrong, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. A project's characteristics are verifiable once presented to the principal, but the principal does not know how many projects are available to the agent. The principal chooses the set of projects which the agent can implement. Three frameworks are considered: (i) a static setting in which the set of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain; (ii) a dynamic setting in which by expending effort the agent can affect the number of projects, and (iii) a dynamic setting in which the agent must wait for projects to materialize. The model is applied to the choice of welfare standard for merger policy. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:42:55Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:be817f9b-effd-4d29-a72f-3235c8a8353e |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:42:55Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishing |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:be817f9b-effd-4d29-a72f-3235c8a8353e2022-03-27T05:40:01ZA Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:be817f9b-effd-4d29-a72f-3235c8a8353eEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsBlackwell Publishing2010Armstrong, MVickers, JWe present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. A project's characteristics are verifiable once presented to the principal, but the principal does not know how many projects are available to the agent. The principal chooses the set of projects which the agent can implement. Three frameworks are considered: (i) a static setting in which the set of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain; (ii) a dynamic setting in which by expending effort the agent can affect the number of projects, and (iii) a dynamic setting in which the agent must wait for projects to materialize. The model is applied to the choice of welfare standard for merger policy. |
| spellingShingle | Armstrong, M Vickers, J A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy. |
| title | A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy. |
| title_full | A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy. |
| title_fullStr | A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy. |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy. |
| title_short | A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy. |
| title_sort | model of delegated project choice with application to merger policy |
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