The anarchy of scheduling without money
We consider the scheduling problem on n strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias 2014] where a machine is bound by her declarations in the sense that if she is assigned a particular job th...
Autors principals: | Giannakopoulos, Y, Koutsoupias, E, Kyropoulou, M |
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Format: | Journal article |
Idioma: | English |
Publicat: |
Elsevier
2019
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