Dynamic weighted voting games

Dynamic weighted voting games

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Bibliografiske detaljer
Main Authors:	Elkind, E, Pasechnik, D, Zick, Y
Format:	Conference item
Udgivet:	2013

Lignende værker

Dynamic Weighted Voting Games
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2013)

Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2009)

Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
af: Pasechnik, Dmitrii V., et al.
Udgivet: (2011)

The Cost of Stability and Its Application to Weighted Voting Games
af: Bachrach, Y, et al.
Udgivet: (2009)

Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games.
af: Zuckerman, M, et al.
Udgivet: (2012)

Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
af: Zuckerman, M, et al.
Udgivet: (2012)

False−Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
af: Aziz, H, et al.
Udgivet: (2011)

False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
af: Aziz, H, et al.
Udgivet: (2014)

On the computational complexity of weighted voting games
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2009)

Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
af: Zuckerman, Michael, et al.
Udgivet: (2013)

𝑘-prize weighted voting games
af: Harrenstein, B, et al.
Udgivet: (2023)

Arbitration and Stability in Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
af: Zick, Y, et al.
Udgivet: (2014)

Arbitration and Stability in Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions.
af: Zick, Y, et al.
Udgivet: (2014)

On Weights and Quotas for Weighted Majority Voting Games
af: Xavier Molinero, et al.
Udgivet: (2021-12-01)

Dynamic Programming for Computing Power Indices for Weighted Voting Games with Precoalitions
af: Jochen Staudacher, et al.
Udgivet: (2021-12-01)

Computing Power Indices for Weighted Voting Games Via Dynamic Programming
af: Jochen Staudacher, et al.
Udgivet: (2021-01-01)

Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions: charting the tractability frontier
af: Zick, Y, et al.
Udgivet: (2019)

Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games over Interaction Networks
af: Meir, R, et al.
Udgivet: (2013)

A Monotonic Weighted Banzhaf Value for Voting Games
af: Conrado M. Manuel, et al.
Udgivet: (2021-06-01)

Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games
af: Acemoglu, Daron, et al.
Udgivet: (2011)

Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2020)

Justified representation in multiwinner voting: Axioms and algorithms
af: Elkind, E
Udgivet: (2018)

On swap convexity of voting rules
af: Obraztsova, S, et al.
Udgivet: (2020)

Distance rationalization of voting rules.
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2015)

Distance rationalization of voting rules
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2015)

Properties of multiwinner voting rules
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2017)

Properties of Multiwinner Voting Rules
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2014)

On swap−distance geometry of voting rules
af: Obraztsova, S, et al.
Udgivet: (2013)

Applying integer programming techniques to find minimum integer weights of voting games
af: Strauss, Aaron B., 1980-
Udgivet: (2005)

Voting Weights Program
af: Ansolabehere, Stephen
Udgivet: (2005)

Gamification of security games in voting
af: Lim, Xiao Qi
Udgivet: (2021)

Orders of Criticality in Voting Games
af: Marco Dall'Aglio, et al.
Udgivet: (2016-01-01)

Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
af: Schlotter, I, et al.
Udgivet: (2015)

On manipulation in multi−winner elections based on scoring rules
af: Obraztsova, S, et al.
Udgivet: (2013)

Electing the Most Probable Without Eliminating the Irrational: Voting Over Intransitive Domains
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2014)

CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SCHEME BASED ON WEIGHTED VOTING GAME AND RATIONAL SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTING
af: N Aravinthan, et al.
Udgivet: (2017-03-01)

Complexity of finding equilibria of plurality voting under structured preferences
af: Elkind, E, et al.
Udgivet: (2016)

Global coordination: weighted voting
af: Jan-Erik Lane
Udgivet: (2014-03-01)

Global coordination: weighted voting
af: Jan-Erik Lane
Udgivet: (2014-03-01)

Bounds on the cost of stabilizing a cooperative game
af: Bachrach, Y, et al.
Udgivet: (2018)