The myth of the benevolent autocrat? Internal constraints, external constraints, and economic development in autocracies
<p>Why do some autocracies produce high economic development while others falter? Despite the large literature comparing democracies and autocracies we know little about differences amongst autocratic regimes. I focus on the rule of one autocrat over time instead of comparing across regimes, a...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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2020
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| _version_ | 1826294440428306432 |
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| author | Nyrup, J |
| author2 | Ansell, B |
| author_facet | Ansell, B Nyrup, J |
| author_sort | Nyrup, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>Why do some autocracies produce high economic development while others falter? Despite the large literature comparing democracies and autocracies we know little about differences amongst autocratic regimes. I focus on the rule of one autocrat over time instead of comparing across regimes, and argue that an autocrat can be constrained by both a strong ruling elite (internal constraints) and an organized civil society (external constraints). I depart from the literature focusing on institutional constraints and use Arendt’s concept of isolation to conceptualize constraints. The two types of constraints generate political accountability. This will result in a pluralistic and thoughtful decision-making process and a better environment for investment. I theorize that both types of constraints are associated with better economic outcomes, but that only external constraints promote
better human development. To test this, I rely on three analyses. First, I conduct a cross-national analysis using a novel dataset, WhoGov, which provides information on the ruling elites. I show that only constrained autocrats are punished for governing over a severe recession. Furthermore, the same dictator governs over better economic
outcomes when his rule is constrained. That said, only external constraints are related to improvements in human development. Second, I use a synthetic control design to investigate the effect of the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and show that the regime, despite not democratizing, increased public spending on health care and education. Third, I show that there is a cost to the ruling elite if they unsuccessfully try to coup the autocrat. In addition, I find that a successful coup is associated with better growth when there is an orderly transfer of power to a new, constrained autocrat, but not if the coup causes political instability. Overall, I show that the belief in the developmental benefits of having a strong autocrat is not supported empirically. Instead, autocrats govern over worse economic development when they become more powerful.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:45:40Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:bf62b975-2259-474b-a468-dba7f01e879c |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:45:40Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:bf62b975-2259-474b-a468-dba7f01e879c2022-03-27T05:47:00ZThe myth of the benevolent autocrat? Internal constraints, external constraints, and economic development in autocraciesThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:bf62b975-2259-474b-a468-dba7f01e879cComparative governmentPolitical scienceEnglishHyrax Deposit2020Nyrup, JAnsell, B<p>Why do some autocracies produce high economic development while others falter? Despite the large literature comparing democracies and autocracies we know little about differences amongst autocratic regimes. I focus on the rule of one autocrat over time instead of comparing across regimes, and argue that an autocrat can be constrained by both a strong ruling elite (internal constraints) and an organized civil society (external constraints). I depart from the literature focusing on institutional constraints and use Arendt’s concept of isolation to conceptualize constraints. The two types of constraints generate political accountability. This will result in a pluralistic and thoughtful decision-making process and a better environment for investment. I theorize that both types of constraints are associated with better economic outcomes, but that only external constraints promote better human development. To test this, I rely on three analyses. First, I conduct a cross-national analysis using a novel dataset, WhoGov, which provides information on the ruling elites. I show that only constrained autocrats are punished for governing over a severe recession. Furthermore, the same dictator governs over better economic outcomes when his rule is constrained. That said, only external constraints are related to improvements in human development. Second, I use a synthetic control design to investigate the effect of the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and show that the regime, despite not democratizing, increased public spending on health care and education. Third, I show that there is a cost to the ruling elite if they unsuccessfully try to coup the autocrat. In addition, I find that a successful coup is associated with better growth when there is an orderly transfer of power to a new, constrained autocrat, but not if the coup causes political instability. Overall, I show that the belief in the developmental benefits of having a strong autocrat is not supported empirically. Instead, autocrats govern over worse economic development when they become more powerful.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Comparative government Political science Nyrup, J The myth of the benevolent autocrat? Internal constraints, external constraints, and economic development in autocracies |
| title | The myth of the benevolent autocrat? Internal constraints, external constraints, and economic development in autocracies |
| title_full | The myth of the benevolent autocrat? Internal constraints, external constraints, and economic development in autocracies |
| title_fullStr | The myth of the benevolent autocrat? Internal constraints, external constraints, and economic development in autocracies |
| title_full_unstemmed | The myth of the benevolent autocrat? Internal constraints, external constraints, and economic development in autocracies |
| title_short | The myth of the benevolent autocrat? Internal constraints, external constraints, and economic development in autocracies |
| title_sort | myth of the benevolent autocrat internal constraints external constraints and economic development in autocracies |
| topic | Comparative government Political science |
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