Electoral uncertainty, the deficit bias and the electoral cycle in a New Keynesian economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where the...

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מידע ביבליוגרפי
Main Authors:	Wren-Lewis, S, Leith, C
פורמט:	Working paper
יצא לאור:	University of Oxford 2009

Electoral Uncertainty, the Deficit Bias and the Electoral Cycle in a New Keynesian Economy. מאת Wren-Lewis, S, Leith, C

יצא לאור 2009

Working paper

Electoral uncertainty, the deficit bias and the electoral cycle in a New Keynesian economy

Electoral Uncertainty, the Deficit Bias and the Electoral Cycle in a New Keynesian Economy. מאת Wren-Lewis, S, Leith, C

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