The unruly mind
This thesis is an evaluation of doxastic normativism. Doxastic normativism is the theory that belief is essentially normative, and that the norm of belief is a constitutive norm. After introducing the taxonomy of normativist views I use throughout the thesis, I discuss four versions of doxastic norm...
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2017
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| _version_ | 1797092669505142784 |
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| author | Schnurr, J |
| author2 | Williamson, T |
| author_facet | Williamson, T Schnurr, J |
| author_sort | Schnurr, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This thesis is an evaluation of doxastic normativism. Doxastic normativism is the theory that belief is essentially normative, and that the norm of belief is a constitutive norm. After introducing the taxonomy of normativist views I use throughout the thesis, I discuss four versions of doxastic normativism: state normativism, conceptual normativism, intentional teleologism, and teleo-functionalism. The first two are those traditionally referred to as “doxastic normativism”, and they are the main targets of the thesis. Discussion of the second two is less extensive, and serves to show that the central problem for normativism lies not in the kind of normativity that it claims is essential to belief, but in the attempt to make any normative property whatsoever a necessary condition for belief. I develop undercutting objections to two arguments for state normativism and to one argument for conceptual normativism. My objections draw on i.a. the semantics of correctness ascriptions, the norms of other intentional states, the nature of rationality, and the evidential sensitivity of belief. Then there are several rebutting objections, drawing on non-agential mental states, the normative classification of epistemically deviant mental states, and difficulties for state-differentiation through norms. The discussions of teleologism and teleo-functionalism demonstrate that these views, although making much weaker claims about belief, fall prey as well to the main problems identified for the core normativist views. The thesis closes on a chapter offering reflections about the reasons behind the failures of normativism, as well as a descriptive theory of belief that I argue can fulfil the explanatory desiderata of doxastic normativism. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:49:19Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:c0aa4d1f-780c-43c3-a013-a0bdad9a2454 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:49:19Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:c0aa4d1f-780c-43c3-a013-a0bdad9a24542022-03-27T05:56:02ZThe unruly mindThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:c0aa4d1f-780c-43c3-a013-a0bdad9a2454EnglishORA Deposit2017Schnurr, JWilliamson, TChild, TThis thesis is an evaluation of doxastic normativism. Doxastic normativism is the theory that belief is essentially normative, and that the norm of belief is a constitutive norm. After introducing the taxonomy of normativist views I use throughout the thesis, I discuss four versions of doxastic normativism: state normativism, conceptual normativism, intentional teleologism, and teleo-functionalism. The first two are those traditionally referred to as “doxastic normativism”, and they are the main targets of the thesis. Discussion of the second two is less extensive, and serves to show that the central problem for normativism lies not in the kind of normativity that it claims is essential to belief, but in the attempt to make any normative property whatsoever a necessary condition for belief. I develop undercutting objections to two arguments for state normativism and to one argument for conceptual normativism. My objections draw on i.a. the semantics of correctness ascriptions, the norms of other intentional states, the nature of rationality, and the evidential sensitivity of belief. Then there are several rebutting objections, drawing on non-agential mental states, the normative classification of epistemically deviant mental states, and difficulties for state-differentiation through norms. The discussions of teleologism and teleo-functionalism demonstrate that these views, although making much weaker claims about belief, fall prey as well to the main problems identified for the core normativist views. The thesis closes on a chapter offering reflections about the reasons behind the failures of normativism, as well as a descriptive theory of belief that I argue can fulfil the explanatory desiderata of doxastic normativism. |
| spellingShingle | Schnurr, J The unruly mind |
| title | The unruly mind |
| title_full | The unruly mind |
| title_fullStr | The unruly mind |
| title_full_unstemmed | The unruly mind |
| title_short | The unruly mind |
| title_sort | unruly mind |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT schnurrj theunrulymind AT schnurrj unrulymind |