Obligación y práctica social
Hart thought that the content of our duties is determined by what we do as a matter of settled practice and their force is given by our attitude of acceptance towards our practice. He thought that both parts of the account constitute conceptual truths to be found in the logic of claims of duty. I sh...
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Book section |
| Language: | Spanish |
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Marcial Pons
2016
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| _version_ | 1797093079154425856 |
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| author | Stavropoulos, N |
| author2 | Ramírez Ludeña, L |
| author_facet | Ramírez Ludeña, L Stavropoulos, N |
| author_sort | Stavropoulos, N |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Hart thought that the content of our duties is determined by what we do as a matter of settled practice and their force is given by our attitude of acceptance towards our practice. He thought that both parts of the account constitute conceptual truths to be found in the logic of claims of duty. I show that these claims fail. I then consider a realist variant which rejects Hart's conception of reasons as a kind of normative attitude. This variant supposes that objective moral facts, ultimately independent of attitudes, must play some role in grounding practice-dependent duties. I show that the account so corrected still fails. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:55:10Z |
| format | Book section |
| id | oxford-uuid:c2a0e8b2-eecd-4bfe-9957-f6798afe1c8e |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | Spanish |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:55:10Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Marcial Pons |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:c2a0e8b2-eecd-4bfe-9957-f6798afe1c8e2022-03-27T06:10:21ZObligación y práctica socialBook sectionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843uuid:c2a0e8b2-eecd-4bfe-9957-f6798afe1c8eSpanishSymplectic ElementsMarcial Pons2016Stavropoulos, NRamírez Ludeña, LRamírez Ludeña, LVilajosana Rubio, JMHart thought that the content of our duties is determined by what we do as a matter of settled practice and their force is given by our attitude of acceptance towards our practice. He thought that both parts of the account constitute conceptual truths to be found in the logic of claims of duty. I show that these claims fail. I then consider a realist variant which rejects Hart's conception of reasons as a kind of normative attitude. This variant supposes that objective moral facts, ultimately independent of attitudes, must play some role in grounding practice-dependent duties. I show that the account so corrected still fails. |
| spellingShingle | Stavropoulos, N Obligación y práctica social |
| title | Obligación y práctica social |
| title_full | Obligación y práctica social |
| title_fullStr | Obligación y práctica social |
| title_full_unstemmed | Obligación y práctica social |
| title_short | Obligación y práctica social |
| title_sort | obligacion y practica social |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stavropoulosn obligacionypracticasocial |