| Summary: | International commercial arbitration has established itself as the main dispute resolution mechanism for international commercial disputes. This increased visibility has drawn attention to arbitrators’ public role, leading to a well-established general perception that arbitrators are bound to special obligations, such as the duty to be independent and impartial or the obligation to assure that arbitral proceedings are not abused to achieve nefarious goals. Despite this general acknowledgement, little attention has been paid to the mechanisms that ensure that arbitrators adhere to these obligations. In particular, there has been limited analysis of the underlying mechanisms that incentivise the production and enforcement of professional norms in this field.
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This thesis argues that the particulars of the arbitration market largely explains why the evolution of the regulation of international arbitrators has not matched those of other professions. At the same time, it will argue that those same particularities create incentives for several actors, most notably the arbitral community itself, to step in and occupy this regulatory vacuum. In particular, it explores the notion that the market strategies employed by arbitrators, arbitral institutions and other members of the arbitral community have the production of professional norms as a by-product. It further explores how the arbitral market tends to create an environment where compliance with professional norms is rewarded, leading, at the same time, the arbitral community to work as a network that promotes adherence to professional norms through mostly informal sanctions.
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