A combined attack-tree and kill-chain approach to designing attack-detection strategies for malicious insiders in cloud computing
Attacks on cloud-computing services are becoming more prevalent with recent victims including Tesla, Aviva Insurance and SIM-card manufacturer Gemalto[1]. The risk posed to organisations from malicious insiders is becoming more widely known about and consequently many are now investing in hardware,...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Conference item |
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IEEE
2019
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| _version_ | 1797093279309758464 |
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| author | Duncan, A Creese, S Goldsmith, M |
| author_facet | Duncan, A Creese, S Goldsmith, M |
| author_sort | Duncan, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Attacks on cloud-computing services are becoming more prevalent with recent victims including Tesla, Aviva Insurance and SIM-card manufacturer Gemalto[1]. The risk posed to organisations from malicious insiders is becoming more widely known about and consequently many are now investing in hardware, software and new processes to try to detect these attacks. As for all types of attack vector, there will always be those which are not known about and those which are known about but remain exceptionally difficult to detect - particularly in a timely manner. We believe that insider attacks are of particular concern in a cloud-computing environment, and that cloud-service providers should enhance their ability to detect them by means of indirect detection. We propose a combined attack-tree and kill-chain based method for identifying multiple indirect detection measures. Specifically, the use of attack trees enables us to encapsulate all detection opportunities for insider attacks in cloud-service environments. Overlaying the attack tree on top of a kill chain in turn facilitates indirect detection opportunities higher-up the tree as well as allowing the provider to determine how far an attack has progressed once suspicious activity is detected. We demonstrate the method through consideration of a specific type of insider attack - that of attempting to capture virtual machines in transit within a cloud cluster via use of a network tap, however, the process discussed here applies equally to all cloud paradigms. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:58:01Z |
| format | Conference item |
| id | oxford-uuid:c388bcd1-fbf6-41bf-9619-719a761ec51d |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T03:58:01Z |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:c388bcd1-fbf6-41bf-9619-719a761ec51d2022-03-27T06:17:12ZA combined attack-tree and kill-chain approach to designing attack-detection strategies for malicious insiders in cloud computingConference itemhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794uuid:c388bcd1-fbf6-41bf-9619-719a761ec51dSymplectic Elements at OxfordIEEE2019Duncan, ACreese, SGoldsmith, MAttacks on cloud-computing services are becoming more prevalent with recent victims including Tesla, Aviva Insurance and SIM-card manufacturer Gemalto[1]. The risk posed to organisations from malicious insiders is becoming more widely known about and consequently many are now investing in hardware, software and new processes to try to detect these attacks. As for all types of attack vector, there will always be those which are not known about and those which are known about but remain exceptionally difficult to detect - particularly in a timely manner. We believe that insider attacks are of particular concern in a cloud-computing environment, and that cloud-service providers should enhance their ability to detect them by means of indirect detection. We propose a combined attack-tree and kill-chain based method for identifying multiple indirect detection measures. Specifically, the use of attack trees enables us to encapsulate all detection opportunities for insider attacks in cloud-service environments. Overlaying the attack tree on top of a kill chain in turn facilitates indirect detection opportunities higher-up the tree as well as allowing the provider to determine how far an attack has progressed once suspicious activity is detected. We demonstrate the method through consideration of a specific type of insider attack - that of attempting to capture virtual machines in transit within a cloud cluster via use of a network tap, however, the process discussed here applies equally to all cloud paradigms. |
| spellingShingle | Duncan, A Creese, S Goldsmith, M A combined attack-tree and kill-chain approach to designing attack-detection strategies for malicious insiders in cloud computing |
| title | A combined attack-tree and kill-chain approach to designing attack-detection strategies for malicious insiders in cloud computing |
| title_full | A combined attack-tree and kill-chain approach to designing attack-detection strategies for malicious insiders in cloud computing |
| title_fullStr | A combined attack-tree and kill-chain approach to designing attack-detection strategies for malicious insiders in cloud computing |
| title_full_unstemmed | A combined attack-tree and kill-chain approach to designing attack-detection strategies for malicious insiders in cloud computing |
| title_short | A combined attack-tree and kill-chain approach to designing attack-detection strategies for malicious insiders in cloud computing |
| title_sort | combined attack tree and kill chain approach to designing attack detection strategies for malicious insiders in cloud computing |
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