Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents.

Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents.

Bibliografiske detaljer
Hovedforfatter:	Malcomson, J
Format:	Journal article
Sprog:	English
Udgivet:	1986

Lignende værker

Principal and Expert Agent.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2004)

Principal and Expert Agent.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2009)

Principal and expert agent
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2004)

Principal and Expert Agent
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2009)

The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem.
af: Malcomson, J, et al.
Udgivet: (1988)

Optimization of Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts: A Principal-Agent Model
af: Hojjatollah Baramaki Yazdi, et al.
Udgivet: (2020-03-01)

Individual Employment Contracts.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1986)

Relational Incentive Contracts.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2010)

Individual Employment Contracts.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1998)

Relational incentive contracts
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2010)

Relational incentive contracts
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2013)

Incomplete Contracts and Involuntary Unemployment.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1985)

Relational contracts and specific training
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2014)

Incentive contract design considering quotas production: A principal-agent perspective
af: Sen Liu, et al.
Udgivet: (2024-01-01)

Trade Union Labour Contracts: An Introduction.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1987)

Uncertainty, investment and productivity with relational contracts
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2021)

Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1997)

Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2015)

Contract Inefficiency, Wages and Employment: An Assessment.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1992)

Contract Inefficiency, Wages and Employment: An Assessment.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1993)

Contracts, Hold-Up and Labor Markets.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1997)

Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2012)

Many universities in Malaysia improve rankings
af: Nanyang, Siang Pau
Udgivet: (2015)

Principal-agent alignment and relational incentive contracts in high-performance service operations
af: Doss, Ryan Garrett
Udgivet: (2014)

Contracts and Competition in the NHS.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1996)

Contracts and Competition in the NHS.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1995)

Relational contracts and specific training
af: Malcomson, JM
Udgivet: (2014)

Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2012)

Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2015)

Contracts for the National Health Service.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1996)

Contracts for the National Health Service.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1996)

Contract Theory and Incentive Compatibility.
af: Coles, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1989)

Uncertainty, investment and productivity with relational contracts
af: Malcomson, JM
Udgivet: (2023)

Incentive Contracts for a Queueing System with a Strategic Server: A Principal-Agent Perspective
af: Jun Tu, et al.
Udgivet: (2023-03-01)

A Study on the Design of Incentive Contracts for Platform Economy Regulation Based on Dual Principal–Agents
af: Ruibi Zhang, et al.
Udgivet: (2024-09-01)

Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1995)

Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1998)

Contract bargaining with symmetric information
af: MacLeod, WB, et al.
Udgivet: (1995)

Agents and principals
af: Sunderland, D
Udgivet: (1997)

Investments, Hold Up and the Reform of Market Contracts.
af: Macleod, W, et al.
Udgivet: (1991)