Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents.

Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents.

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Malcomson, J
Formato:	Journal article
Idioma:	English
Publicado em:	1986

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