Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.

Case studies as well as cross-country studies suggest that countries with an abundance of natural resources are more prone to violent conflict. This collection of articles analyzes the link between natural resources and civil war in a number of different ways. So far the literature falls broadly int...

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Main Authors: Collier, P, Hoeffler, A
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: SAGE Publications 2005
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author Collier, P
Hoeffler, A
author_facet Collier, P
Hoeffler, A
author_sort Collier, P
collection OXFORD
description Case studies as well as cross-country studies suggest that countries with an abundance of natural resources are more prone to violent conflict. This collection of articles analyzes the link between natural resources and civil war in a number of different ways. So far the literature falls broadly into two camps. First, in the economics literature the well-documented "resource curse" leads to low-income growth rates and low levels of income. These in turn constitute low opportunity costs for rebellion and make civil war more likely. On the other hand, political science literature concentrates on the link between natural resources and weak institutions. States with natural resources often rely on a system of patronage and do not develop a democratic system based on electoral competition, scrutiny and civil rights. Based on further empirical evidence in this volume we conclude with a brief overview of current policy initiatives.
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spelling oxford-uuid:c441e004-ed0b-40e4-9d14-c8d1910e4a222022-03-27T06:22:09ZResource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:c441e004-ed0b-40e4-9d14-c8d1910e4a22EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsSAGE Publications2005Collier, PHoeffler, ACase studies as well as cross-country studies suggest that countries with an abundance of natural resources are more prone to violent conflict. This collection of articles analyzes the link between natural resources and civil war in a number of different ways. So far the literature falls broadly into two camps. First, in the economics literature the well-documented "resource curse" leads to low-income growth rates and low levels of income. These in turn constitute low opportunity costs for rebellion and make civil war more likely. On the other hand, political science literature concentrates on the link between natural resources and weak institutions. States with natural resources often rely on a system of patronage and do not develop a democratic system based on electoral competition, scrutiny and civil rights. Based on further empirical evidence in this volume we conclude with a brief overview of current policy initiatives.
spellingShingle Collier, P
Hoeffler, A
Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.
title Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.
title_full Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.
title_fullStr Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.
title_full_unstemmed Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.
title_short Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.
title_sort resource rents governance and conflict
work_keys_str_mv AT collierp resourcerentsgovernanceandconflict
AT hoefflera resourcerentsgovernanceandconflict