Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling
We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goo...
Main Authors: | Browning, M, Lechene, V, Chiappori, P |
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Format: | Working paper |
Izdano: |
University of Oxford
2006
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