Dynamic merger review.

We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority toward horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger may affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, whose characteristics may not yet be...

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Main Authors: Nocke, V, Whinston, M
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: University of Chicago Press 2010
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author Nocke, V
Whinston, M
author_facet Nocke, V
Whinston, M
author_sort Nocke, V
collection OXFORD
description We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority toward horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger may affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, whose characteristics may not yet be known. We identify conditions under which discounted expected consumer surplus is maximized by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure. We also discuss a number of extensions as well as factors that undermine the optimality of myopic merger review policies.
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spelling oxford-uuid:c61c6072-7703-432d-87c5-b20696d7327c2022-03-27T06:35:54ZDynamic merger review. Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:c61c6072-7703-432d-87c5-b20696d7327cEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsUniversity of Chicago Press2010Nocke, VWhinston, MWe analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority toward horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger may affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, whose characteristics may not yet be known. We identify conditions under which discounted expected consumer surplus is maximized by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure. We also discuss a number of extensions as well as factors that undermine the optimality of myopic merger review policies.
spellingShingle Nocke, V
Whinston, M
Dynamic merger review.
title Dynamic merger review.
title_full Dynamic merger review.
title_fullStr Dynamic merger review.
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic merger review.
title_short Dynamic merger review.
title_sort dynamic merger review
work_keys_str_mv AT nockev dynamicmergerreview
AT whinstonm dynamicmergerreview