Insider trading, costly monitoring, and managerial incentives
We derive conditions under which permitting manager “insiders” to trade on personal account increases the equilibrium level of output and the welfare of shareholders. These increases are produced by two effects of insider trading. First, insider trading impounds information about hidden managerial a...
Autori principali: | Noe, T, Hu, J |
---|---|
Natura: | Journal article |
Pubblicazione: |
2001
|
Documenti analoghi
Documenti analoghi
-
Managerial incentives and corporate control
di: Novaes, Walter
Pubblicazione: (2005) -
Managerial incentives : on the near optimality of linearity
di: Diamond, Peter A.
Pubblicazione: (2011) -
Managerial incentives : on the near optimality of linearity
di: Diamond, Peter A.
Pubblicazione: (2011) -
Managerial incentives and control in public enterprises
di: Navajas, F, et al.
Pubblicazione: (1985) -
Business strategy, human capital, and managerial incentives.
di: Mailath, G, et al.
Pubblicazione: (2004)