Believing in compatibilism
In this response, I argue that we do not need to appeal to incompatibilist conceptions of agency to understand how belief formation and revision can be agential. When our belief formation mechanisms are appropriately reasons responsive and reactive, they partially constitute our agency, but such rea...
Main Author: | Levy, N |
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Format: | Journal article |
Published: |
University of Oviedo
2018
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