Moral hazard in repeated procurement of services
This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a two period model with a potential repeated agency relationship. In the first period, there is an incumbent who provides a service. In the second period, there is a contest stage in which the principal selects the next service provider. The ag...
主要作者: | Esteve-Gonzalez, P |
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格式: | Journal article |
出版: |
Elsevier
2016
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