Complexity of finding equilibria of plurality voting under structured preferences
We study the complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in voting games over well-known restricted preference domains, such as the domains of single-peaked and single-crossing preferences. We focus on the Plurality rule, and, following the recent work of Elkind et al. [15], consider three popular ti...
主要な著者: | Elkind, E, Markakis, E, Obraztsova, S, Skowron, P |
---|---|
フォーマット: | Conference item |
言語: | English |
出版事項: |
ACM
2016
|
類似資料
-
On swap convexity of voting rules
著者:: Obraztsova, S, 等
出版事項: (2020) -
On swap−distance geometry of voting rules
著者:: Obraztsova, S, 等
出版事項: (2013) -
Properties of multiwinner voting rules
著者:: Elkind, E, 等
出版事項: (2017) -
Properties of Multiwinner Voting Rules
著者:: Elkind, E, 等
出版事項: (2014) -
Social choice under metric preferences: scoring rules and STV
著者:: Skowron, P, 等
出版事項: (2017)