The compatibility between a theologically relevant libertarian notion of freewill and contemporary neuroscience research

<p>The notion that we are voluntary agents who exercise power to choose and, in doing so, determine some of what happens in the world has been an important notion in certain theological accounts concerning our relationship with God (e.g. 'the freewill defence' for God's goodness...

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Main Author: Runyan, JD
Other Authors: van den Toren, B
Format: Thesis
Language:English
Published: 2009
Subjects:
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author Runyan, JD
author2 van den Toren, B
author_facet van den Toren, B
Runyan, JD
author_sort Runyan, JD
collection OXFORD
description <p>The notion that we are voluntary agents who exercise power to choose and, in doing so, determine some of what happens in the world has been an important notion in certain theological accounts concerning our relationship with God (e.g. 'the freewill defence' for God's goodness and omnipotence in light of moral evil and accounts of human moral responsibility in relation to God). However, it has been claimed that the physicalism supported by contemporary neuroscience research calls into question human voluntary agency and, with it, human power to choose. Emergentist (or non-reductive physicalist) accounts of psychological phenomena have been presented as a way of reconciling the physicalism supported by contemporary neuroscience and the theologically important notion of human power to choose. But there are several issues that remain for the plausibility of the required kind of emergentist account; namely - <em>Does recent neuroscience research show that voluntary agency is an illusion? and Is there evidence for neurophysiological causes which, along with neurophysiological conditions, determine all we do?</em> In this dissertation I set out to address these issues and, in doing so, present an account of voluntary agency as power to choose in the state of being aware of alternatives. I argue that this account allows for the notion that human beings determine some of what happens in a way that is consistent with what contemporary neuroscience shows. Thus, contemporary neuroscience does not undermine this notion of human voluntary agency; or, then, the predominant theological view that we are morally responsible in our relationship with God.</p>
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spelling oxford-uuid:cb895aa4-16e3-4bce-8feb-e93ab217207a2022-03-27T07:15:30ZThe compatibility between a theologically relevant libertarian notion of freewill and contemporary neuroscience researchThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:cb895aa4-16e3-4bce-8feb-e93ab217207aScience and religionPhilosophy of mindNeuroscienceEpistemology,causation,humankindPhilosophyCognitive NeurosciencePsychologyModern theologyNeuropsychologyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2009Runyan, JDvan den Toren, BHyman, J<p>The notion that we are voluntary agents who exercise power to choose and, in doing so, determine some of what happens in the world has been an important notion in certain theological accounts concerning our relationship with God (e.g. 'the freewill defence' for God's goodness and omnipotence in light of moral evil and accounts of human moral responsibility in relation to God). However, it has been claimed that the physicalism supported by contemporary neuroscience research calls into question human voluntary agency and, with it, human power to choose. Emergentist (or non-reductive physicalist) accounts of psychological phenomena have been presented as a way of reconciling the physicalism supported by contemporary neuroscience and the theologically important notion of human power to choose. But there are several issues that remain for the plausibility of the required kind of emergentist account; namely - <em>Does recent neuroscience research show that voluntary agency is an illusion? and Is there evidence for neurophysiological causes which, along with neurophysiological conditions, determine all we do?</em> In this dissertation I set out to address these issues and, in doing so, present an account of voluntary agency as power to choose in the state of being aware of alternatives. I argue that this account allows for the notion that human beings determine some of what happens in a way that is consistent with what contemporary neuroscience shows. Thus, contemporary neuroscience does not undermine this notion of human voluntary agency; or, then, the predominant theological view that we are morally responsible in our relationship with God.</p>
spellingShingle Science and religion
Philosophy of mind
Neuroscience
Epistemology,causation,humankind
Philosophy
Cognitive Neuroscience
Psychology
Modern theology
Neuropsychology
Runyan, JD
The compatibility between a theologically relevant libertarian notion of freewill and contemporary neuroscience research
title The compatibility between a theologically relevant libertarian notion of freewill and contemporary neuroscience research
title_full The compatibility between a theologically relevant libertarian notion of freewill and contemporary neuroscience research
title_fullStr The compatibility between a theologically relevant libertarian notion of freewill and contemporary neuroscience research
title_full_unstemmed The compatibility between a theologically relevant libertarian notion of freewill and contemporary neuroscience research
title_short The compatibility between a theologically relevant libertarian notion of freewill and contemporary neuroscience research
title_sort compatibility between a theologically relevant libertarian notion of freewill and contemporary neuroscience research
topic Science and religion
Philosophy of mind
Neuroscience
Epistemology,causation,humankind
Philosophy
Cognitive Neuroscience
Psychology
Modern theology
Neuropsychology
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