Hard Debt, Soft CEO`s and Union Rents.
Sometimes shareholders are better off delegating to a CEO with different objectives than their own. A top manager motivated to share surpluses with workers can encourage union members to adopt efficient production methods. Bond covenants may constrain managers from acquiescing to union wage demands....
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| Format: | Working paper |
| Sprache: | English |
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Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2003
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| _version_ | 1826296856127209472 |
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| author | Wilson, L |
| author_facet | Wilson, L |
| author_sort | Wilson, L |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Sometimes shareholders are better off delegating to a CEO with different objectives than their own. A top manager motivated to share surpluses with workers can encourage union members to adopt efficient production methods. Bond covenants may constrain managers from acquiescing to union wage demands. Nevertheless, we argue that unions can win higher wages by altering the non-shirking constraint. Resistance to monitoring leads to deadweight losses that a “soft” CEO can prevent. In this context, managerial retrenchment and incentive contracts with limited upsides are advocated. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T04:22:46Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:cb964622-f7d1-4c62-8328-27c58df19cd3 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T04:22:46Z |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publisher | Department of Economics (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:cb964622-f7d1-4c62-8328-27c58df19cd32022-03-27T07:15:53ZHard Debt, Soft CEO`s and Union Rents.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:cb964622-f7d1-4c62-8328-27c58df19cd3EnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2003Wilson, LSometimes shareholders are better off delegating to a CEO with different objectives than their own. A top manager motivated to share surpluses with workers can encourage union members to adopt efficient production methods. Bond covenants may constrain managers from acquiescing to union wage demands. Nevertheless, we argue that unions can win higher wages by altering the non-shirking constraint. Resistance to monitoring leads to deadweight losses that a “soft” CEO can prevent. In this context, managerial retrenchment and incentive contracts with limited upsides are advocated. |
| spellingShingle | Wilson, L Hard Debt, Soft CEO`s and Union Rents. |
| title | Hard Debt, Soft CEO`s and Union Rents. |
| title_full | Hard Debt, Soft CEO`s and Union Rents. |
| title_fullStr | Hard Debt, Soft CEO`s and Union Rents. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Hard Debt, Soft CEO`s and Union Rents. |
| title_short | Hard Debt, Soft CEO`s and Union Rents. |
| title_sort | hard debt soft ceo s and union rents |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT wilsonl harddebtsoftceosandunionrents |