Hard Debt, Soft CEO`s and Union Rents.
Sometimes shareholders are better off delegating to a CEO with different objectives than their own. A top manager motivated to share surpluses with workers can encourage union members to adopt efficient production methods. Bond covenants may constrain managers from acquiescing to union wage demands....
Prif Awdur: | Wilson, L |
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Fformat: | Working paper |
Iaith: | English |
Cyhoeddwyd: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2003
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