Beth's theorem and deflationism - Reply to bays
Is the restricted, consistent, version of the T-scheme sufficient for an 'implicit definition' of truth? In a sense, the answer is yes (Haack 1978, Quine 1953). Section 4 of Ketland 1999 mentions this but gives a result saying that the T-scheme does not implicitly define truth in the stron...
Glavni avtor: | Ketland, J |
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Format: | Journal article |
Jezik: | English |
Izdano: |
2009
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